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OUTLAWING PENSION-FUNDING
SHORTFALLS
Eric D. Chason*

Before ERISA, employees faced a large risk that their employers
would default or renege on pension obligations. By creating a federal
guarantor of pensions (the PBGC), ERISA has greatly reduced this
risk. All else being equal, low-risk pensions are worth more to
employees but cost more to provide. Congress has never had a
coherent policy on who should pay for these extra costs. Moreover,
legal scholars have failed to create a theoretical framework for dealing
with these costs, focusing instead on the supposed "moral hazard" that
the PBGC guaranty creates. This Article inserts itself into the scholarly
vacuum, asserting that employers should bear the full cost of providing
low-risk pensions to their employees.
The onlypracticable way to force employers to bear these costs is
by requiring pension plans to be fully funded. Current law, however,
tolerates persistent pension-funding shortfalls with a set of accounting
conventions that allow employers to defer and spread funding
obligations over several years. Only the powerful tax incentives of the
Internal Revenue Code have the potential to draw employers to full
funding. Unprofitable employers, however, will not respond to these
incentives, choosing instead the subsidized guaranty offered by the
PBGC. Because the PBGC guaranty is essentially a guaranty of
corporate debt, the subsidized guaranty distorts the efficiency of capital
markets. Outlawing pension-funding shortfalls would eliminate these
subsidies.
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School of Law. B.A., Duke University; J.D., University of Virginia. All rights are
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thank the College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law for its
financial support of this project.
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I.

lNTRODUCfiON
1

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) relies on two methods to secure payment of pension
benefits. Employers must set funds aside in trust. They must also buy
insurance from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).

' Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
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Yet, the current system has produced large deficits for the PBGC and
high-profile failures of pension plans. These problems prompted
Congress to overhaul the system of pension funding with the Pension
2
Protection Act of 2006 (PPA 2006).
PPA 2006 may reduce, but will not solve, the problems of pension
funding and insurance. The funding and insurance rules have been,
and will remain, incoherent without further reform, for Congress has
never had a coherent policy in mind when drafting them.
Policymakers and scholars often assume that pension-funding rules
3
should balance the interests of different constituents. Retirees want
their pension benefits to be secure. Current employees want security
as well, but also the opportunity to earn more benefits in the future.
Employers want flexibility over plan contributions and low PBGC
premiums. Taxpayers, if they pay attention at all, want to avoid, or at
least mitigate, any bailout of the PBGC. Because these interests are
irreconcilable, Congress has been responding to cacophony. The
4
result is a broken system of pension funding and insurance.
This Article does not seek to rebalance the interests of different
political groups. Instead, it tries to identify and justify the goals that
pension-funding rules should - and can actually - achieve. It then
tries to sketch a system of pension funding and insurance that would
satisfy these goals.
The first goal is the risk-minimization goal. It holds that
employees should bear little or no risk that employers will default on
pension obligations. Without pension regulation, employees face
significant default risk. Their employer could file for bankruptcy or
even change its mind about the payment of benefits. To a large
extent, ERISA satisfies the risk-minimization goal with its system of
benefit vesting, PBGC insurance, and plan funding.
The second goal is the employer-internalization goal. It holds that
employers should bear the cost of achieving the risk-minimization
goal. It applies to employers individually and does not require strong
2

Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
3
Cf, e.g., Kathryn J. Kennedy, Pension Funding Reform: It's Time to Get the
Rules Right (Part 2), 108 TAX NoTES 1039, 1041 (2005) (stating that "a balanced
pension reform cannot be accomplished without compromises" and listing ten
"factors (that] should be utilized in critiquing any reform").
4
For an excellent and detailed description, see Kathryn J. Kennedy, Pension
Funding Reform: It's Time to Get the Rules Right (Part 1), 108 TAX NOTES 907 (2005).
For a brief overview of legislation up to 2003, see Jeremy Gold, Stopping the Insanity
in Pension Funding, CONTINGENCIES, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 34.
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employers to protect the employees of weak employers. The current
system allows persistent plan underfunding and charges a scanty
premium for PBGC insurance. Congress has failed the employerinternalization goal. Even PPA 2006, arguably the most significant
revision of pension law since ERISA was passed, will let underfunding
continue. Thus, financially weak employers can continue to shift
some of their pension costs to financially strong employers.
Taxpayers still face the risk of bearing these costs in the future.
Two practices have plagued pension funding since the passage of
ERISA. One is amortization of losses. Rather than forcing
employers to make up funding shortfalls on a yearly basis, ERISA
allows employers to defer shortfalls for years. The other practice is
"smoothing." Rather than forcing employers to value assets and
liabilities at current market values, ERISA allows employers to use
historical averages. Amortization and smoothing both mask financial
risk. Nevertheless, financial-market volatility is often what creates
5
funding shortfalls. These shortfalls are breaches that may widen, not
aberrations that should be wished away. Someone must bear the costs
of funding shortfalls. The employer-internalization goal places them
upon the employer.
To satisfy the two goals, this Article proposes a system of full
funding of pension obligations. Full funding would end amortization
and smoothing. It would also minimize the role of PBGC insurance,
which is needed only if there are funding shortfalls. Even under the
proposal, PBGC insurance would still be needed. However, it would
protect only against short-term financial volatility and against
differences between estimated and actual plan liabilities.
Part II of this Article describes the risk-minimization goal. This
goal is uncontroversial, but its implementation increases the expense
of pension obligations.
Thus, the goal affects the employerinternalization goal, described in Part III. Part III also describes how
tax deductions for contributions lure only financially strong employers
into funding their plans. By charging all employers for coverage that
benefits only the weak, the PBGC effectively subsidizes the pension
plans of financially weak employers. Indeed, the value of the subsidy
grows as financial strength weakens. Part IV sketches a system of full
funding that would implement the employer-internalization goal for
all employers, weak and strong. Part V provides a brief conclusion.

5

See Lawrence N. Bader & Jeremy Gold, Reinventing Pension Actuarial
Science, THE PENSION FORUM, Jan. 2003, at 1, 12 ("Volatility is a property of markets;
it is not a disease for which accounting is the cure.").
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RISK-MINIMIZATION GOAL

A. The Purpose of ERISA
Risk minimization is central to ERISA. Prior to the passage of
ERISA in 1974, prefunding of pension obligations was almost wholly
6
discretionary on the part of the employer. The lack of collateral
exposed employees to the risk of default if the employer went
bankrupt or terminated the plan. This risk became reality in 1963
when Studebaker Corporation closed its South Bend, Indiana,
manufacturing plant. The plant shutdown led to Studebaker's
termination of its underfunded, union-negotiated pension plan. The
plan had enough assets to pay full benefits to those who had already
reached age sixty. After satisfying the claims of the sixty-and-over
workers, the plan had few assets to satisfy the claims of younger
workers. Some received benefits worth about 15% of the face value
of their claims. Some received nothing at all. The Studebaker
incident was a sensation, leading to Congressional hearings and media
scrutiny of pension funding. Even though Congress waited another
eleven years to pass ERISA, the Studebaker incident remained vivid
in the minds of policy makers and is recognized as a catalyst for the
7
passage of ERISA.
Mandatory prefunding of pension obligations is the first defense
8
against employer default. All pension plans must have assets held in
9
trust, pursuant to a written instrument. The trust subjects plan
administrators to fiduciary duties. ERISA clarifies these duties by
directing the fiduciary to hold assets for the exclusive benefit of the
1
employees. ° Calculating the amount that employers must contribute
to their plans is the subject of Part III.C.
ERISA also regulates default risk by mandating vesting.
Therefore, a plan cannot condition benefits on the financial health of

6

See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
LAw 355 (3d ed. 2000). An employer that stopped funding a plan might
cause all benefits in the plan to vest - but only to the extent the plan was already
funded. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.401-6(a) (1963); see also Treas. Reg.§ 1.401-6(c) (1963)
(describing the types of funding failures that would trigger vesting).
7
For a more comprehensive treatment of the Studebaker incident, see James
A. Wooten,o''The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business": The StudebakerPackard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001).
8
See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 910-11.
9
See ERISA§§ 402(a), 403(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a), 1103(a) (2006).
10
ERISA§ 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006).
BENEFIT

Virginia Tax Review

524

[Vol. 26:519

the employer or on service beyond five or seven years (depending on
11
the schedule chosen).
The protection of vesting also includes
protection against plan amendments that would cut back previously
12
earned benefits.
In summary, funding, fiduciary regulation, and vesting are at the
core of ERISA and implement the risk-minimization goal. Because
those elements only partially implement the risk-minimization goal,
Congress created a system of pension insurance to guaranty payment
of pension benefits. This guaranty is discussed in the next Part.
B. Government Guaranty against Default
ERISA created the PBGC to guaranty the payment of most
13
The guaranty protects
private, defined-benefit pension benefits.
employees against the risk of default when an employer terminates its
pension plan. The guaranty does not directly benefit employers, who
are responsible for funding plan shortfalls unless their plans are
14
terminated (typically in bankruptcy or liquidation).
The indirect
benefits of the guaranty to the employer are the subject of Part III.E.
15
ERISA caps the level of guarantied benefits.
For plans
terminating in 2006, the cap is a yearly benefit, starting at age sixty16
five, of $47,659. The cap is reduced if the employee elects a form of
17
payment different from a single-life annuity starting at age sixty-five.
Often, reductions reflect the early start of payments before age sixty11
12
13

See I.R.C. § 41l(a).
See I.R.C. § 41l(d)(6).

The guaranty does not extend to defined contribution plans (such as 401(k),
403(b), 457 plans, and ESOPs); very small plans with twenty-five or fewer active
participants; plans maintained for a select group of management or highly
compensated employees; governmental plans; church plans; and welfare plans, such as
retiree medical plans. See ERISA § 4021(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(a), (b) (2006)
(describing inclusions and exclusions from coverage).
14
See discussion infra Part III.B (comparing pension obligations with debt
obligations).
15
See ERISA§ 4022,29 U.S.C. § 1322 (2006).
16
See Press Release, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., PBGC Announces
Maximum Insurance Benefit for 2006 (Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.pbgc.gov/media/
news-archive/2005/pr06-09.html. The cap applies to all pensions of any one person.
Thus, if someone is a participant in two failed plans, a single cap still applies; the cap
is determined at the time of the last plan termination affecting the participant. See
ERISA§ 4022B, 29 U.S.C. § 1322b (2006); 29 C.F.R. pt. 4022B.l(a) (2006).
17
See ERISA § 4022(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (2006) (referring to the
"actuarial value of a monthly benefit in the form of a life annuity commencing at age
(sixty-five]").
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five or the value of survivor benefits (e.g., a 50% survivor annuity for
a spouse).
The guarantied amounts are well below the largest benefits that a
pension plan can provide under the tax laws. For 2006, the largest
18
amount allowed is a yearly benefit of $175,000. Because very few
19
employees approach this amount, the PBGC cap will cover most
20
pension benefits payable to employees.
When a plan fails, employees have claims against the PBGC and
remaining plan assets. The allocation of plan assets is, however,
inconsistent with the PBGC guaranty. Regardless of the size of their
benefits, employees who started (or could have started) receiving
benefits three or more years before termination have the highest
21
priority claim against plan assets. Such employees might continue to
receive full benefits above the cap, even if the PBGC must step in to
22
pay the benefits of other employees.
When underfunded plans terminate and trigger the PBGC
guaranty, the PBGC receives the assets of terminated plans. The
PBGC needs other assets to pay for the shortfall. To do this, the
23
PBGC collects annual premiums.
An annual, flat fee of $30 per
covered employee applies to every single-employer plan covered by
24
the PBGC guaranty program.
The $30 fee is fixed. It applies
regardless of the funding quality of the plan, the financial well being
18

See I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (establishing $160,000 cap); I.R.C. § 415(d) (subjecting
the cap to cost-of-living increases); I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-120 (Oct. 14, 2005)
(stating that the year 2006 cap is $175,000).
19
Consider a rather rich formula that pays benefits equal to 1.5% percent of
compensation times years of service. If a participant had thirty years of service, he
would not reach the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) cap unless his
compensation was $105,909 or more. The Internal Revenue Code (Code) places a
cap of $220,000 on compensation that can be used to calculate pension benefits. See
I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (establishing a $200,000 cap on compensation subject to cost-ofliving increases); I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-120 (Oct. 14, 2005) (stating that the
year 2006 cap is $220,000). If a participant had $220,000 or more of compensation, he
would not reach the PBGC cap unless he had fifteen or more years of service.
Therefore, for participants commencing benefits at age sixty-five, the PBGC cap is
relevant only to well-paid, long-service employees.
20
See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 6, at 901.
21
See ERISA § 4044(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3) (2006). I am assuming that
the plan did not contain employee contributions. Cf ERISA § 4044(a)(1), (2), 29
U.S.C. § 1344(a)(1), (2) (2006) (giving highest priority to employee contributions).
22
See ERISA§ 4044(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (2006).
1
z. See ERISA § 4005, 29 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006); DAN MCGILL ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 815 (8th ed. 2005).
24
See ERISA§ 4006(a)(3)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
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of the employer, or even the amount of benefits promised to
employees.
The PBGC also collects another fee, called the "variable-rate
premium," from some underfunded plans. The variable-rate premium
is equal to 0.9% of the plan's underfunded amount, calculated on an
25
annual basis. Yet, the 0.9% premium is inadequate because it is less
than the default premiums demanded by corporate bond markets.
Data on corporate bonds for the week ending January 13, 2006 are
26
shown below:
TABLE I.

U.S. Treasury bond, 10-year constant maturity
U.S. Treasury bond, 20-vear constant maturity
Moody's Seasoned Aaa Index
Moody's Seasoned Baa Index

4.41%
4.65%
5.29%
6.24%

For the best credit risks, the 0.9% default premium could be
appropriate. For the Baa grade and below, it clearly fails. Because
the worst credit risks have the highest likelihood of paying the
variable rate premium, the 0.9% fee is too small.
In recent years, the most prominent plan failures have been of
airlines and steel manufacturers in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Starting in
2006, ERISA imposes a surcharge on employers that terminate
underfunded plans in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The annual surcharge is
27
$1250 per participant for the three years after plan termination.
ERISA imposes no duty on the federal government to maintain
the PBGC's solvency.28 If the PBGC ever goes insolvent, retirees
might find their benefits cut, even though the PBGC guarantied them.
After all, a guaranty is only as good as the guarantor. Many observers
think Congress would bail out the PBGC and its covered employees in
the event of failure, much as it bailed out the savings and loan
29
industry in the early 1990s.
In summary, the PBGC guaranty achieves the risk-minimization

2

See ERISA§ 4006(a)(3)(A)(i), (E), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i), (E) (2006).
Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Selected Interest Rates (Jan. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hl5/20060117/h15.pdf.
27
See ERISA§ 4006(a)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(7) (2006).
28
See ERISA § 4022(g)(2), 29 U.S.C § 1322(g)(2) (2006) ("The United States
government is not liable for any obligation or liability incurred by the [PBGC).").
29
Cf. Richard A. Ippolito, How to Reduce the Cost of Federal Pension
Insurance, 523 CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2004), available at http://www.cato.
org/pubs/pas/pa523.pdf.
$

26
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goal by eliminating much (but not all) of the default risk that
employees face. A system of user fees currently pays for this
guaranty, but the system has a weak correlation to default risk and
fails to keep the PBGC solvent. The next Part describes other
protections for employees and shows how these protections tend to
30
discourage the funding of pension plans.

C. Regulation of Pension Settlements
The risk-minimization goal makes it expensive for companies to
settle their pension obligations. The anti-alienation rule of ERISA
prohibits employers from bargaining with employees over the
31
settlement of pension obligations. Therefore, outside of bankruptcy
or liquidation, the only ways for employers to discharge pension
obligations are through regulated lump-sum payments, annuity
purchases, and risk-free funding. Each of these methods has low risk,
entailing interest rates lower than those at which employers can raise
other sources of funds. This Part will show why those lower interest
rates cause employers to resist funding their pension plans.
An employer might try to discharge its pension obligations by
paying a lump sum. Usually, an employee's pension benefit is stated
as a single-life annuity that the employee may start taking at age sixtyfive. ERISA allows pension plans to pay benefits in a lump sum after
32
an employee ends employment.
These lump-sum options are
33
increasingly common, but ERISA regulates their calculation. In
order to arrive at a lump sum, the age sixty-five annuity must be
converted to present value using mortality and interest assumptions.
Before PPA 2006, ERISA obliged plans to calculate the lump sum
34
using the interest rate on the 30-year Treasury bond. After PPA
2006, lump-sum payments will be valued using the yield on high-grade
35
corporate debt.
Regulating lump sums is necessary to implement the risk-

30

Cf William Sharpe, Corporate Pension Funding Policy, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 183
(1976) (examining the effect of the PBGC gu~ranty on funding).
31
See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A).
32
Pension payments before termination are generally prohibited. See Treas.
Reg.§ 1.401-1(a)(2)(i) (1976).
33
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION AND LONG-TERM BUDGETARY CHALLENGES 11 (2005) (describing
increasing prevalence of lump-sum distributions from defined benefit plans).
34
See Treas. Reg.§ 1.417(e)-1(d)(3)(i) (2003).
35
See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 302(b), I.R.C. § 417(e).
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minimization goal. Pension obligations are low risk and should be
valued as such. However, the implementation causes employers to
resist funding and other settlements of their pensions. It will usually
cost employers more to borrow from outsiders than from their
pensioners.
To see this, suppose a company has a stylized pension that obliges
the employer to make a $1 million balloon payment in ten years. The
company can borrow money at 7%, but lump-sum distributions must
be valued using a 5% interest rate. Essentially, the employer is
borrowing from the employee at the regulated rate of 5% rather than
the market rate of7%.
The employer is considering two options for dealing with the
pension plan. The first is simply to wait ten years and pay the $1
million. The second is to discharge the pension today with a lumpsum payment; the employer obtains the funds for the lump sum by
borrowing, with repayment in ten years. Thus, comparing year ten
cash flows will identify the better approach.
The waiting approach obviously produces a year ten cash outflow
of $1 million. The borrowing approach, however, produces a higher
year ten outflow. ERISA mandates a lump-sum payment of
36
$606,531 which is $1 million discounted for ten years at 5%.
However, the employer must repay this amount using a higher interest
37
rate of 7%. The $606,531 debt grows to $1,221,403 in ten years.
Discharging the pension with outside borrowing is expensive because
it subjects the employer to an interest-rate whipsaw. In essence, the
employer would be refinancing its pension debt by giving up a low 5%
interest rate in exchange for a high 7% interest rate.
A similar whipsaw applies if the employer settles its obligation
38
with an annuity contract or plan funding. Annuity contracts have
low risk and will be valued using an interest rate that is likely lower
than the employer's cost of borrowing. The yields published by the
39
PBGC to value annuities are lower than the long-term risk-free rate.
36

37

$1,000,000 + (e 111x1u15 ).
$606,531 X ( e toxom).

JS Readers familiar with academic finance may feel
uneasy about these
assertions. I am not saying that shareholder value falls when the company borrows at
7% in order to buy a 5% risk-free bond. What reduces shareholder value is the
transfer of the proceeds to the employee in satisfaction of the pension.
39
The Internal Revenue Service (Service) reported rate of interest on 30-year
Treasury securities for November 2005 is 4.73%. I.R.S. Notice 2005-96, 2005-2 C.B.
1209. The PBGC interest rates for valuing annuity benefits for the month of
November 2005 are 3.70% for the first 20 years following the date of plan termination
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Similarly, plan funding must be in risk-free assets to achieve a true
settlement. Otherwise, the employer remains subject to the risk of
default on plan investments. Only if it fully funds the plan and has the
plan invest in U.S. Treasury bonds will the employer be able to
discharge its pension obligations completely. The discount rate for
40
such a portfolio would be the long-term risk-free rate.
Thus, the cost of discharging pension obligations with full funding
or annuity contracts is similar to that of discharging the obligations
with lump-sum payments. In each case, liabilities must be measured
according to some settlement rate of interest. This rate would differ
based upon the settlement chosen (lump sum, risk-free funding, or
41
annuity purchase).
The important thing, however, is that the
settlement rate will often be lower than the rate at which the
employer could borrow funds. Because of this fact, plan funding and
other settlements tend to be expensive.
In summary, ERISA reinforces the risk-minimization goal by
regulating the valuation of lump-sum distributions and by prohibiting
sales by employees of their pension benefits. These regulations
protect employees from selling their benefits too cheaply, but they
also show how the risk-minimization goal affects employer incentives.
The funding decision affects the value of the company because
pension obligations, unlike other obligations of the company, are
regulated to be low risk. In order to discharge pension obligations
completely, employers can choose from three types of settlements:
regulated lump sums, full funding with risk-free assets, or low-risk
annuity contracts. However, employers cannot ordinarily borrow
funds at the low interest rates associated with these settlements. Thus,
without tax incentives, employers will resist funding their pension
obligations.

and 4.75% thereafter. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., INTEREST RATE UPDATE
(Oct. 15, 2005), http://www.pbgc.gov/practitioners/interest-rates/content/Month2005
/ir15126.html; cf. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SINGLE-EMPLOYER PENSION
INSURANCE PROGRAM FACES SIGNIFICANT LONG-TERM RISKS, 49-52 (2003)
(comparing termination interest rates with 30-year Treasury interest rates).
40
See Lawrence N. Bader, Pension Deficits: An Unnecessary Evil, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., May-June 2004 at 17 [hereinafter Bader, Unnecessary Evil]; Bader &
Gold, supra note 5, at 5.
41
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87, the accounting standard
for pensions, adopts a similar concept of settlement rates. EMPLOYERS' AccouNTING
FOR PENSIONS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87, § 77 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1985).
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D. Irrelevance of Moral Hazard

Part II.C showed why employers would resist plan funding
without the allure of tax benefits. This Part shows that employees
have no reason to counteract this resistance. As a result, the main
reasons that employers fund their plans are to receive tax benefits and
to comply with the funding rules of ERISA.
Employees covered by the guaranty have little reason to worry
about plan funding. Without the PBGC guaranty, the employees
would surely worry and might even demand more secure funding for
their pension benefits. Because of the PBGC guaranty, extra funding
gives the employees little extra security. Thus, the employer's funding
42
decision and the employees' desires are hardly related at all.
The employees' indifference to funding presents a technical case
of moral hazard. Ultimately, we will see that the case is merely
technical and tells us very little of importance about pension funding
and insurance. Since, however, moral hazard is such a common
43
critique of the current system, it is addressed here. What is moral
hazard? In Game Theory and the Law, the authors note:
Insurance contracts must also take into account a moral
hazard problem, a problem of hidden action. An insurer is
not able to learn exactly how an individual behaves once the
insurance contract is purchased. Hence, the contract cannot
be written in a way that protects the insurance company from

42

Professor Keating makes a similar point. He says:

While the ability of employers to affect pension funding is fairly clear, the
role of the employees in avoiding the risk of underfunding should not be
overlooked. In the LTV Supreme Court case, the PBGC stressed how
employees can influence the funding levels of their promised pensions.
One of the reasons the PBGC does not completely cover all pension
benefits is that employees will have some incentive to insist to their
employers that pension plans be adequately funded - the so-called "coinsurance feature" of the system.
Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIS. L. REV.
65, 75 [hereinafter Keating, Moral Hazard]. Indeed, some empirical evidence
supports the notion that the PBGC guaranty actually reduced funding quality. See
RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSURANCE 95, 125-295 (1989).
43
See, e.g., Keating, Moral Hazard, supra note 42, passim; Nicholas J. Brannick,
Note, At the Crossroads of Three Codes: How Employers Are Using ERISA, the Tax
Code, and Bankruptcy to Evade Their Pension Obligations, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1577
passim (2004).
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individuals taking actions they would not take if they did not

44
.
have msurance.

Other standard works state that hidden action is the meaning of moral
45
hazard. The essence of this hidden action is that it is conduct that
contractual parties or regulators cannot control cost effectively.
However, moral hazard implies a level of futility that is absent
from the ERISA context. A typical case of moral hazard involves the
standard of care that an insured exercises over insured property.
Buyers of home insurance will lower the precautions they take against
fire and theft. Insurers and buyers would be better off if they could
execute enforceable contracts that say, "The insured shall exercise the
same standard of care over the property that he would exercise if the
policy were not in place." Enforcing such a clause is absurd, because
the insurer must be able to determine the actual standard of care
exercised and the standard of care that would have been exercised had
the contract never existed. Because insurers cannot enforce this
clause, the standard of care exercised by insurance buyers will fall.
The literal definition of moral hazard does apply to employees.
Because of the PBGC guaranty, they have no reason to demand
greater funding or conservative investment of funds. However, there
is no need to worry about whether the employees bargain for the right

44

DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 153 (1998).
See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 577 (1990)
(referring to moral hazard as the problem where "one party to a transaction may
undertake certain actions that (a) affect the other party's valuation of the transaction
but that (b) the second party cannot monitor/enforce perfectly"); ANDREU MASCOLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 477 (1995) (referring to moral hazard as
the case of hidden action); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 298--99 (3d
ed. 1992) (stating that the problem of moral hazard in insurance contracts would
disappear if insurers could observe the level of care taken by their insureds). Some
scholars define the term differently. Judge Posner calls moral hazard "The tendency
of an insured to relax his efforts to prevent the occurrence of the risk that he has
insured against because he has shifted the risk to an insurance company." RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (6th ed. 2003). This formulation is
close to hidden action, although it would cover precautions that might be controlled
by contract, such as a home-insurance discount for the use of sprinklers. Professor
Richard Ippolito gives a broad definition that moral hazard occurs "when mispricing
arises in a buyer-seller contract." RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LA WYERS
350 (2005). Professor Keating calls it "[t]he problem ... that those who are insured
against certain risks have an incentive to use less than optimal care to avoid those
risks." Keating, Moral Hazard, supra note 42, at 67-68. For a detailed examination
of moral hazard, see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV.
237 (1996).
45
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level of funding. All that matters ultimately is the level of plan
funding, which is not hidden and can be regulated. ERISA should
simply require funding that minimizes the risk of default. Part III lays
out the case for full funding. Part IV sketches a proposal that would
implement full funding.
III. EMPLOYER-INTERNALIZATION GOAL

A. Introduction
The previous Part identified the risk-minimization goal as central
to ERISA. This goal holds that employees should face little if any
default risks on their pensions. This Part will discuss the employerinternalization goal, which holds that employers should bear the cost
of accomplishing the risk-minimization goal, but only with respect to
their own employees. Part III.B will show how pension obligations
are like debt obligations, because employers can avoid paying these
costs only through liquidation or bankruptcy.
Unless plans are fully funded, the avoidance of pension
obligations in liquidation or bankruptcy violates the employerinternalization goal. Part III.C will show how ERISA falls short of
requiring funding that would satisfy the employer-internalization goal.
Yet, employers are free to contribute more than what is required by
the funding rules. The main reason to do so would be tax benefits.
Part III.D examines the interaction of the funding rules and the rules
for tax deductibility. The conclusion is that employers with high costs
of borrowing and low marginal tax rates will resist funding their plans.
Part III.E uses this conclusion to build a normative case for the
employer-internalization goal. Current law subsidizes underfunding
by companies with high borrowing costs and low tax rates. Thus,
current law can be seen as a form of lemon socialism, where weak
companies are subsidized at the expense of the strong.

B. Obligation to Pay
A pensiOn plan is an obligation to pay cash in the future.
46

46

Cf John Ralfe et al., Pensions and Capital Structure: Why Hold Equities in the
Pension Fund?, N. AM. AcrUARIALl., July 2004, at 103. Ralfe states:

Pension promises represent a debt owed by the company to the pension
plan members. Pension liabilities are economic liabilities of the company,
not the pension plan, as the company has to make good shortfalls in the
pension plan. The pension represents a debt owed by the company to the
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Because pension plans typically cover large groups of employees, the
law of large numbers allows employers and their actuaries to project a
reasonably accurate schedule of cash payments to be made in the
future. These cash payments are like debt repayments. ERISA
makes the pension promise enforceable in federal court and prevents
an employer from conditioning payments on having enough profits or
the like. Before ERISA, employers could terminate underfunded
plans without incurring any obligation to fund the shortfalls. Because
there was no federal pension guaranty at that time, participants
potentially bore the full loss without any further claim against the
47
employer.
Even in its early days, ERISA allowed at-will termination of
underfunded plans, but protected the employees with the PBGC
guaranty of benefits. The PBGC had some recourse when an
employer terminated an underfunded plan. The plan termination
gave the PBGC all plan assets plus a claim against the employer for
the shortfall. But, the claim was limited to 30% of the net worth of
48
the employer and its controlled group. This structure led financial
economists to conclude that the employer essentially held a put
option. The economists thought that ERISA allowed a company to
force (put) its pension liabilities upon the PBGC in exchange for
49
giving up the plan assets and 30% of the company's net worth. The
put right was unilateral, as it was not conditioned upon bankruptcy or
other financial distress. Because of this ability to avoid pension
liabilities, some economists questioned whether pension plans could
be thought of as debt. 50
The unilateral put right was ended in 1986, with the passage of the
51
Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act (SEPPA). SEPPA
pension fund members.
/d. at 104. Keating, Moral Hazard, supra note 42, at 77 ("When a company
underfunds its pension plan, the firm is in effect 'borrowing' money from the PBGC
on an unsecured basis similar to a firm's drawing down an unsecured line of credit.").
47
See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 6, at 910.
48
See McGILL ET AL., supra note 23, at 806--D7.
49
Cf, e.g., Sharpe, supra note 30, at 185 (creating a model where " [i]f there is a
shortfall, the employees will receive only [the plan assets], and the company will not
be liable for the deficiency").
~ See id.
51
Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 82 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). Recent
commentators remain under the misimpression that total liability is 30%. See, e.g.,
MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH
270 (3d ed. 2005) ("After the passage of ERISA, firms can now put the pension plan
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established three types of plan terminations. If a plan is fully funded,
the employer can terminate it at will after complying with PBGC
52
procedures in a "standard termination." The plan terminates by
offering annuity contracts (issued by insurance companies) and lumpsum distributions to the participants. The standard termination fully
discharges the claims of the employees and removes the PBGC from
any potential liability for the plan. 53
SEPPA established two procedures by which underfunded plans
54
could terminate.
They are a "distress termination" and an
"involuntary termination."55
Both types of terminations are
56
conditioned upon financial distress by the employer. Termination by
either method is usually used during liquidation or Chapter 11
reorganization.57 The distinction between the two is that the employer
institutes a distress termination, whereas the PBGC institutes an
involuntary termination.58 Without terminating the underfunded plan,
the employer will need to contribute funds to the plan according to
the funding requirements of the Internal Review Code (Code) and

assets plus 30% of the market value of the company to the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) to satisfy the pension claims.").
52
See ERISA § 4041(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2006) (setting forth exclusive
means for plan terminations); ERISA § 4041(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b) (2006)
(describing standard terminations).
53
For example, the PBGC takes the position that it has no obligation to insure
benefits if an insurance company fails to pay on the annuity contracts. See PBGC
Letter on PBGC Liability for Payment of Benefits in Case of Annuity Contract
Failure, reprinted in 18 BNA PENSION REP. 850 (1991). Moreover, the PBGC takes
the position that the employer itself has no such liability. See PBGC Letter on Plan
Sponsor Liability after Purchase of Group Annuity Contract, reprinted in 18 BNA
PENSION REP. 850 (1991).
54
See ERISA§ 4041(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c) (2006).
55
See ERISA§ 4042,29 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).
6
~ See ERISA§ 4041(c)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B) (2006); ERISA §
4041(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006).
57
See Frank Cummings, Pension Plan Terminations - Single Employer Plans,
TAXMGMf. PORTFOLIO (BNA) No. 357-3d, at A-18 (2002).
58
!d. at A-17 to -18. In Chapter 11 reorganization, a collective-bargaining
agreement can prevent termination of the plan. See ERISA § 4043(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1341(a)(3) (2006). Collective bargaining agreements do not prevent the PBGC
from seeking an involuntary termination of the plan. See id. Chapter-11 employers
often ask the PBGC to seek an involuntary termination in order to overcome
collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 640 (1990) ("LTV, however, could not voluntarily terminate the
Plans because two of them had been negotiated in collective bargaining. LTV
therefore sought to have the PBGC terminate the Plans.").
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59

ERISA. Thus, distress termination and involuntary termination are
the only ways to avoid the pension liabilities of underfunded pension
plans.
The PBGC does receive debt claims following distress or
involuntary terminations for the funding shortfall of the plan.60 The
claim is for the value of all benefits (not just those benefits that the
61
PBGC guaranties) under the plan, minus the value of plan assets.
Thus, the claim of the PBGC goes beyond its own financial exposure
62
to guarantied benefits. It acts as more than a mere guarantor with a
right of subrogation against the debtor. It is also a collection agency
for employees, with the authority to seek funds from the employer to
pay benefit obligations in excess of those it has guarantied.63 For
example, suppose that a plan terminates with $10 million in assets, $10
million in PBGC-guarantied benefits, and $5 million in other benefits.
The PBGC receives a claim for the $5 million shortfall, enforceable on
behalf of employees, even though the PBGC has no liability of its
own. If the liability exceeds 30% of the combined net worth of the
employer and its affiliates, then the liability exceeding such 30% may
64
be deferred on commercially reasonable terms.
Upon a distress or involuntary termination, the PBGC receives a
lien in the property of the employer and its affiliates, capped at 30%
65
of the combined net worth of their total property. If termination
occurs after bankruptcy, the automatic stay will prevent the PBGC
66
from perfecting its lien.
The resulting inability of the PBGC to
perfect its lien usually leaves it as an unsecured creditor in
bankruptcy. As a result of its unsecured status, the PBGC will likely
recover only a portion of its claim. If the termination occurs in
Chapter 11, the PBGC may even receive stock in the bankrupt

59

See infra Part III.C for a discussion of these requirements.
See Daniel Keating, Chapter ll's New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and
Bankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REV. 803, 813-15 (1993) [hereinafter Keating, Ten-Ton
Monster] (describing the PBGC claims after plan termination).
61
See ERISA§ 4001(a)(18), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(18) (2006).
62
Cf. ERISA § 4001(a)(17), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(17) (2006) (defining "amount
of unfunded guarantied benefit liabilities" to cover only those benefits guarantied by
the PBGC).
63
See ERISA § 4022(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (2006) (stating that the PBGC will
pay additional benefits attributable to its recovery efforts).
64
See ERISA§ 4062(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(2) (2006).
65
See ERISA§ 4068(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2006).
66
See Keating, Ten-Ton Monster, supra note 60, at 827.
60
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67

employer to satisfy its claim.
The potential to perfect a lien is
important, even if the PBGC rarely does so. Outside of bankruptcy or
liquidation, few plan sponsors attempt distress terminations because
the PBGC could perfect its lien.
A distress or involuntary termination is more limited than a
bankruptcy discharge. A significant difference is the power of the
PBGC to restore the terminated plan to the employer if the employer
68
later has a significant improvement in financial health.
Another
difference is the surcharge that the PBGC imposes on plans that
terminate in Chapter 11 bankruptcy - $1250 per participant per year
69
for three years following termination. Thus, employers must actually
pay a substantial fee to discharge their pension obligations in Chapter
11. These two differences (restoration and surcharge) are minor and
illustrate that discharging pension obligations is actually more difficult
than discharging other debt.
In summary, employers have a legal obligation to pay pension
obligations that is similar to the obligation to pay debt. Employers
can terminate fully funded plans at will, but must be in financial
distress (typically bankruptcy or liquidation) to terminate
underfunded plans. Termination gives the PBGC claims against the
employer (and affiliates) for any funding shortfall. Thus, employers
can avoid their pension obligations, but can do so only in the way they
avoid other obligations - through bankruptcy or liquidation.
Recall, however, that the risk-minimization goal minimizes the
risk of employer default faced by employees. The employerinternalization goal is thwarted if employers escape pension
obligations after bankruptcy or liquidation. Someone other than the
employer bears the burden of these obligations. Full funding of
pension plans would be needed to achieve the employerinternalization goal and the failure of current law to achieve this goal
is introduced in the next Part.
C. Obligation to Fund

1. Introduction
Part II demonstrated that ERISA largely achieves the riskminimization goal. Its ultimate failure to achieve the employer67

See Michael Schroeder, Big Stakes in Ailing Airlines Raise Questions for U.S.
Pension Agency, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2005, at Al.
68
See ERISA§ 4047,29 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006).
69
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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internalization goal is established in this Part.
Part II.B showed how the premium charged by the PBGC barely
relates to risk of default. Thus, the premium system fails to achieve
the employer-internalization goal. Part III.B showed that employers
do have a legal obligation to pay pension obligations, but this
obligation can be avoided by plan termination in bankruptcy or
liquidation. Employers need to internalize the cost of paying pension
obligations for all contingencies, whether or not they end up in
bankruptcy or liquidation. Thus, the law of plan terminations falls
short of the employer-internalization goal.
Posting enough collateral by funding the pension obligation
would satisfy the employer-internalization goal and ERISA does
require some plan funding. As this Part will show, however, ERISA
falls well short of the full funding that would be need to satisfy the
employer-internalization goal.
2. Discounting Pension Liabilities to Present Value
The starting point for the funding rules is a determination of the
plan's liabilities. Pension plans represent an employer's obligation to
pay cash in the future and these obligations are valued by discounting
to present value. The crucial assumption in this valuation is the
interest rate used, as higher interest rates lead to lower present values.
A leading treatise notes:
The present value of a series of future contingent payments is
a function of the rate of investment return, or of interest at
which the payments are discounted - the higher the interest
assumption, the smaller the present value. Pension plan costs
and liabilities are extremely sensitive to the interest
assumption in the valuation formula because of the long timelapse between the accrual of a benefit credit and its payment.
The precise impact of the interest assumption depends upon
[other actuarial assumptions]; but it is a fairly sound
generalization that, for a typical plan, a change (upward or
downward) of 1[%] in the interest assumption (e.g., an
increase from 6 to 7[%]) alters the long-run cost estimate by
70
about 25[% ].

70

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 23, at 611-12. Other sources suggest that the 25%
figure is too high. See, e.g., Daniel Farley, Selecting a "Liability Appropriate" Fixed
Income Mgt Approach, POINT OF VIEW, Dec. 15, 2003, http://www. ssga.cornllibrary/
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In recent times, the funding rules have specified two rates for valuing
pension liabilities: high-grade corporate bonds and 30-year Treasury
71
bonds. Current law uses high-grade corporate bonds.
To see the practical difference between the two rates, consider
that a 1% increase in the discount rate might lower the reported value
72
of pension liabilities by 10% to 25%.
The high-grade corporate
73
bond rate for December 2003 was 5.81 %, whereas the 30-year
Treasury rate for December 2003 was 5.07% - a difference of
74
0.74%.
Compared to the Treasury rate, the corporate rate might
lower the reported value of plan liabilities by 7.4% to 18.5%. Higher
interest rates produce lower liabilities, at least on paper. These lower
liabilities reduce the obligation to fund a plan.
Full implementation of the risk-minimization goal implies that the
30-year Treasury rate is correct. If pension obligations are to be truly
risk free, then they must be discounted at a risk-free rate. It is a false
argument that plans are able to earn rates of return higher than the
risk-free rate by investing in equities or corporate bonds. This
argument confuses earned returns and expected returns. A plan can
expect a higher rate of return by investing in risky assets, but it must
subject itself to risk in order to earn it. The higher return is not
earned until after the risk turns out well. If the risk turns out badly,
asset values fall, creating a funding shortfall. Thus, a mismatch
between the fixed liability and the risky asset endangers plan
75
funding. Indeed, the mismatch between plan assets and liabilities is a
76
major cause of the current problems of the PBGC.
The value of a liability is the cost of discharging it, whether or not
the debtor sets aside high-yield or low-yield assets to fund it.
Consumers do not get to discount their debt payments by paying them

povw/danfarleyselectingaliabilty20031215/page.html (asserting that a typical plan has
a liability duration of ten to fifteen years).
71
See I.R.C. § 412(b)(5). PPA 2006 will change the calculation of this rate
starting in 2008. Then, the funding rules will incorporate a yield curve (e.g., with
short-term rates applying to short-term obligations). See Pension Protection Act of
2006 § 112, I.R.C. § 430.
72 See supra note 70 an d accompanying text.
73
I.R.S. Notice 2004-34, 2004-1 C.B. 848.
74
I.R.S. Notice 2004-3, 2004-1 C.B. 391.
75
See G. Bennett Stewart III, Pension Roulette: Have You B et Too Much on
Equities?, HARV. Bus. REV., June 2003, at 104, 105.
76
See Zvi Bodie, On Asset-Liability Matching and Federal Deposit and Pension
Insurance, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., July-Aug. 2006, at 323 [hereinafter
Bodie, Asset-Liability Matching].
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off in stock rather than cash and plan sponsors should not either.
There are, however, legitimate arguments for using something
higher than the risk·free rate. Unlike Treasury bonds, the PBGC
guaranty carries some risk of default and the guaranty is capped.
Also, employers can use the high·grade corporate bond rate to settle
their pension obligations. Starting in 2008, employers will calculate
lump·sum distributions using high·grade corporate bond yields. And,
it is possible that employers can satisfy their pension obligations by
purchasing annuity contracts that are valued using something higher
78
than the risk·free rate.
This Article will leave the correct discount rate as an issue
needing more research. Part IV.B does suggest a bifurcated approach
that would value PBGC guarantied benefits at the risk-free rate and
other benefits at some higher rate. What should be clear, however, is
that liabilities should be valued using current, not historical, interest
rates. The problem of smoothing over asset and liability values with
historical averages is discussed in the next Part.
3. Smoothing Assets and Liabilities Using Historical Averages
Rather than value assets at current fair market value and
liabilities at current interest rates, the funding rules allow plans to use
average asset values and average interest rates, determined over an
historical period. These smoothing rules continue a theme first
discussed in the prior subpart - protecting employers from financial
market volatility. As in the prior subpart, however, volatility creates
real shortfalls, which the PBGC guaranties. Left unfunded, these
shortfalls violate the employer·intemalization goal. Yet, the funding
rules are drafted specifically to wish· away shortfalls created by
volatility.
In valuing assets, Treasury regulations currently allow smoothing
79
of asset values over five years. PPA 2006 also allows for smoothing
with historical averages, but only over two years. The asset smoothing
rules do limit deviations from current values; the resulting average
n Cf Lawrence N. Bader, The Case Against Stock in Corporate Pension Funds,
Feb. 2003, at 17 ("[C]ompanies add no value for shareholders by
doing what the shareholders could do for themselves - investing in publicly traded
securities.").
78
But cf Bader, Unnecessary Evil, supra note 40, at 19 ("[A]nnuity purchase
rates are unlikely to be significantly (if at all) below liabilities that combine Treasury
rates with the demographic assumptions used for funding the plans.").
79
I.R.C. § 412(c)(2)(A).
PENSION SEC. NEWS,
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must be between 90% and 110% of the fair market value of plan
80
assets. In valuing liabilities, current law allows plans to average the
81
discount rate over four years.
PPA 2006 shortens the averaging
82
period to two years. Unlike the smoothing rules for asset valuations,
the interest smoothing rules do not limit deviations from current
interest rates.
These smoothing mechanisms mask the shortfalls created by
financial volatility. Suppose that, last year, a plan was fully funded
(but just barely). If interest rates fall one percentage point (e.g., from
7% to 6% ), liability values would almost certainly rise by at least
10%? Adding a 10% decline in the plan's asset values could create a
funding shortfall of 20%, based on market values. Because of
smoothing conventions, the funding rules recognize only a fraction of
the true shortfall that has been created.
But employees and the PBGC are exposed to underfunding based
on market values, not accounting conventions and wishful thinking.
Smoothing violates the weak form of the random walk theory of asset
prices (also known as the efficient market theory). If an asset is worth
$100 today, its value from last year has no effect on its expected value
a year from now. Moreover, the smoothing rules implicitly allow an
employer to satisfy liabilities with assets valued at historical prices.
The prior subpart showed how incredible it would be to apply the
funding rules to consumer debt, noting that consumers cannot
discount debt payments by paying with high-yield stock rather than
84
zero-yield cash. For the same reason, consumers cannot ask their
lenders to accept payment in stock based on values from last year.
But smoothing is not the most significant failure of the funding
rules. Even after obscuring the values of assets and liabilities, the
funding rules allow employers to defer the obligation to satisfy the
resulting short fall. This deferral mechanism is discussed in the next
subpart.
4. Deferring Shortfalls Using Amortizations and Waivers
Achieving the employer-internalization goal would require full
funding of pension plans at all times. The previous subpart showed
how accounting conventions obscure the measurement of funding
80
81

82
83
84

See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. § 430(g)(3).
See I.R.C. § 412(b)(5).
See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. § 430(h)(2).
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 77.
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shortfalls. This subpart shows that the funding rules fail to require full
funding of the incorrectly measured shortfall.
Current law and PPA 2006 both require annual contributions to
underfunded plans equal to the normal cost, which is the portion of
85
liabilities attributable to the current year. But plans can have very
large shortfalls independent of the normal cost. For example, an
employer might voluntarily increase liabilities by increasing plan
benefits. Or financial volatility might produce funding shortfalls when
asset values fall and liability values rise (in response to falling interest
rates). Current law allows plans to amortize these liabilities over
86
periods ranging from five to thirty years. PPA 2006 provides a single
87
period of seven years to amortize most other liabilities. More lenient
88
rules apply to the airlines. Thus, neither PPA 2006 nor current law
tries to force employers to fund their plans fully.
Plans with very poor funding may face additional contributions.
However, these contributions still fall short of full funding. In
simplified terms, current law requires an additional contribution if the
plan is less than 80% funded (and possibly if the plan is less than
90% ). The additional contribution is between 18% and 30% of the
plan's underfunding; the applicable percentage depends on the
PPA 2006 calculates additional
severity of underfunding.
contributions differently, requiring them if plan funding is below two
thresholds. The first threshold is a current-year funding level of 80%
using ordinary actuarial assumptions. The second threshold is a
previous-year funding level of 70% using more stringent actuarial
assumptions. These percentages are phased in from 2008 to 2011. A
plan that meets neither threshold will have its required contribution
increased according to the more stringent assumptions and will pay an
additional charge of $700 per participant and 4% of plan liabilities.
89
More lenient rules apply to the automobile industry.
The precise details of this system are not, however, very
important. What is important is that both current law and PPA 2006
tolerate funding shortfalls over extended periods of time. Employers
are responsible for immediate funding of only a fraction of the
s.~ See I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(A); Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C.
§ 430(a)(l)(A). No contribution is required, however, if the plan is fully funded. See
I.R.C. § 412(c)(6); Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. § 430(a)(2).
86

See I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(B).
g) See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. § 430(c)(2).
88
See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 402(a), 120 Stat.
780,922.
89
See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 112(a), I.R.C. § 430(i)(4)(C).
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funding shortfalls in their plans.
Employers can avoid making even this contribution by obtaining
a funding waiver from the Internal Revenue Service (Service), which
may waive the required contributions if the employer is "unable to
satisfy the minimum funding standard . . . without temporary
substantial business hardship ... and if application of the [funding]
standard would be adverse to the interests of plan participants in the
90
aggregate .... " A key reason for granting the waiver is the fear that
91
the plan would be terminated unless a waiver is granted. Waived
92
liabilities must be amortized over five years.
Funding waivers are particularly incoherent compared to the
additional contributions required from poorly funded plans. On the
one hand, the funding rules excuse the shakiest companies from
making contributions if they successfully plead their case to the
Service. On the other hand, the funding rules require enhanced
contributions from companies with the most poorly funded plans.
Even the institutional goals of the agencies are crossed. The Service
administers the funding rules and sees tax revenues increase when
employers make lower plan contributions. The PBGC administers the
insurance system and sees its risk exposure increase when employers
make lower plan contributions. Funding waivers are thus a fitting end
to the brief review of the funding rules contained in this Part.
5. Summary
In summary, neither current law nor PPA 2006 achieves the
Both sets of law distort the
employer-internalization goal.
measurement of assets and liabilities by allowing employers to use
historical values and smoothing rather . than market values. More
importantly, both sets of law fail to require full funding of the
shortfalls that are recognized under the flawed standards. Instead,
employers can amortize the shortfalls over five or more years. Finally,
and perhaps most perversely, both sets of law allow employers to
avoid paying the insufficient funding obligations by seeking a waiver
from the Service - an institution that has no discernable interest in
the sufficiency of plan funding.
As a result, current law and PPA 2006 subsidize the underfunding
of pension plans. But, how much should the American public care?

90

91
92

l.R.C. § 412(d)(l).
See I.R.C. § 412(d)(2)(D).
See I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(C).
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Pension subsidies, paid for by taxpayers, are nothing new. Taxpayers
are already subsidizing pension plans through the Code at an annual
93
expense that is far greater than the overall deficit of the PBGC. The
remainder of this Part will discuss why the PBGC subsidy is
particularly objectionable, thus supplying normative support for the
employer-internalization goal. To this end, the next Part will develop
a theory of funding to show why financially strong employers tend to
fund their plans while financially weak ones resist funding.
D. Taxes, the Cost of Capital, and the Funding Decision
Without the regulation and tax structure of pension law,
employers might be indifferent to funding their pension plans.
Companies might borrow from outsiders and replace pension debt
94
with outside debt.
Shareholders may not care whether their
company owes money to an employee or a bank. Part II.C, however,
showed why employers care. Pension regulation makes funding a plan
expensive. Because pension obligations are regulated, they must be
discounted at low interest rates. If these low rates are lower than the
rates at which employers could borrow, employers will resist plan
funding. In addition, the funding rules require only a fraction of full
funding. However, as discussed in this Part, the taxation of pensions
95
could prompt an employer to fund above the minimum amount.
Without the cash on hand to fund the plan, employers could
borrow from third parties. Borrowing to fund the pension plan
merely replaces one creditor (the employees) with another (the third93

The tax subsidy for these plans is about $108 billion per year. See STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005-2009, at 38 (Joint Comm. Print 2005).
Perhaps half of that can be attributed to defined-benefit pension plans. In
comparison, recall that the expected deficit for all claims the PBGC expects to pay is
$23.1 billion.
94
See Bader, Unnecessary Evil, supra note 40, at 15.
95
See Regina T. Jefferson, Defined Benefit Funding: How Much is Too Much?,
44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 52 (1993) ("[A]n employer subject to federal income tax is
usually reluctant to contribute more than can be deducted in a plan year . ... "); cf
Fischer Black, The Tax Consequences of Long-Run Pension Policy, J. APPLIED CoRP.
FIN., Winter 2006, at 8 (examining the tax incentives to fund a pension plan); Irwin
Tepper, Tax and Corporate Pension Policy, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1976). One might be
able to create an elaborate story in which employers fund their plans as a way to
signal its true cost to outside investors. This seems unlikely as the essence of funding
is to harm outside investors by exempting assets from their claims. Moreover, funding
levels are determined by actuarial methods, the results of which can be simply
communicated to outside investors.
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party lenders). The interest cost of new debt is a proxy for the cost of
other sources of capital. Rather than borrowing to fund the plan, the
company could also issue new equity or use working capital. Those
decisions are about the company's capital structure. Under the
Modigliani-Miller theorem the decision does not affect company value
96
unless the decision affects taxes and transactions costs.
So, this Part will assume that the source of funding comes from
outside borrowing, but the analysis would hold if funding came from
another source. This Part will compare the cost of leaving a plan
unfunded with the cost of paying lump sums. Lump-sum payments
are computationally convenient and reflect the cost of discharging
pension obligations. Paying the lump sum is simply one type of
settlement. Other types of settlement (full funding and annuity
purchases) would be analyzed exactly the same way after identifying
the appropriate settlement rate.
Recall the stylized pension plan and example in Part II.C. There,
the employer had a pension plan that will pay $1 million in ten years.
The employer can borrow at 7%, but the statutory rate for valuing
lump sums is 5%. The employer looks at two approaches: wait-andpay (under which the employer does no funding and pays the pension
in ten years) and borrow-to-pay (under which the employer borrows
the funds needed to pay a lump sum). The example in Part II.C
showed that the employer would resist settling the pension today and
would choose wait-and-pay approach. 97
Let us introduce the effect of taxation and suppose the employer
is subject to a 50% income tax rate. Now, the employer will pursue
the borrow-to-pay approach. The employer will see that the wait-andpay approach results in a year ten cash outflow of $500,000. Code
section 404 denies the employer any deduction for the pension
98
expense until funding actually occurs.
Because the $1 million
payment would be deductible - but only in year ten - it costs the
employer only $500,000. The borrow-to-pay approach results in the
employer paying a lump sum of $606,531, which is $1 million
discounted by the settlement rate of 5%. A contribution of $606,531
is deductible and has an after-tax cost of only $303,265. The employer
borrows this amount and pays an after-tax rate of interest at only
3.5%; the true cost of borrowing is reduced to reflect the value of the
tax deduction. If the employer structures the debt as a balloon
96
97

98

See POSNER, supra note 45, at 476.
See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 404.
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repayment in ten years, it will need to repay $430,354 in ten years.
Comparing the year ten cash outflows, the wait-and-pay approach
costs $500,000 and the borrow-to-fund approach costs $430,354. So,
the employer will choose to fund the plan and pay the lump sum.
The after-tax cost of borrowing accounts for the difference in the
two examples. In the zero-tax example, it truly cost the employer 7%
to borrow funds. In the 50%-tax example, it cost the employer only
3.5% to borrow funds. Thus, the relevant question is whether the
after-tax cost of borrowing is above or below the settlement rate. If it
is above, the employer does not fund. If it is below, the employer
does fund.
Although the settlement rate is the same for all employers, the
101
marginal tax rate and borrowing rate vary widely. Financially strong
employers tend to have low borrowing rates and high tax rates. As a
result, they will tend to fund their plans. Financially weak employers
tend to have high borrowing rates and low tax rates. As a result,
102
financially weak companies will tend to resist funding their plans.
99

Repayment of the interest in ten years does not prevent an accrual-method
taxpayer from deducting interim interest. Most corporate employers are accrual basis
taxpayers. See I.R.C. §§ 446, 448. Accrual basis taxpayers may deduct items before
cash payment, if the item is represented by a liability, once "all the events have
occurred that establish the fact of the liability, the amount of the liability can be
determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has occurred with
respect to the liability." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii)(A) (2006); see also I.R.C. §
461(h)(2)(A)(i) (stating that economic performance by employer occurs when
employee performs services). This "all-events test" is the key to accrual accounting
and would allow the employer to deduct compensation paid with borrowed funds plus
any interest expenses.
100
$303,265 X ( eJOxn.nJs).
101

The before-tax borrowing rate could be determined by looking at publicly
traded debt. The tax rate (which determines the after-tax borrowing rate) is more
complicated. Perhaps the best concept here is of a marginal tax rate: the present
value of any additional taxes incurred by reason of an additional dollar of income.
For many corporations, an additional dollar of current income can affect the tax
liabilities for prior and later tax years (e.g., because of the carry back and carry
forward of net operating losses). Financial economists have used sophisticated
techniques to estimate marginal tax rates for corporations. See generally SCHOLES ET
AL., supra note 51, at 184-93.
102
Cf Andrew H. Chen & James L. Bicksler, The Integration of Insurance and
Taxes in Corporate Pension Strategy, 40 J. FIN. 943 (1985) (identifying the "tax effect"
and the "insurance effect" as the two main determinants of a corporation's funding
strategy). Empirical research has linked poor financial health and low pension
funding. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RECENT EXPERIENCES OF LARGE
DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS ILLUSTRATE WEAKNESSES IN FUNDING RULES 4 (2005);
Watson Wyatt, Cashing In: Do Aggressive Funding Policies Lead to Higher Credit
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The normative implications of this failure are discussed in the next
Part.
E. Lemon Socialism and Subsidized Underfunding

By insuring pension obligations against employer default, the
PBGC guaranty satisfies the risk-minimization goal. However, by
collecting inadequate premiums and demanding minimal
contributions, the funding and insurance rules fail to satisfy the
employer-internalization goal. Thus, current law and PPA 2006
subsidize underfunded pension plans. This Part will describe how the
PBGC subsidy harms the beneficial discipline of capital markets.
Premium payments by well-funded plans have kept the PBGC
from collapse. Some have even suggested that transfers were an
intentional part of "industrial policy" at the time ERISA was
103
passed. Such transfers run the risk of creating an adverse-selection
problem, driving the best risks out of the insurance pool and leaving
104
only the worst.
Although transfers among employers might be
political reality, they are not good policy.
Ultimately, the PBGC subsidy might cost taxpayers, who could be
called upon for a savings-and-loan-style bailout. Taxpayers already
subsidize pension plans through the Code at an annual expense that is
105
far greater than the overall deficit of the PBGC.
Unlike the tax
subsidy, however, a PBGC subsidy interferes with workings of capital
markets. Rather than exploring the fiscal cost of a PBGC bailout
106
(which could be large), this Part will instead focus on how the
PBGC guaranty interferes with capital markets.
Capital markets channel scarce resources to projects with the
highest returns. Projects with low or negative expected returns do not
receive funding.
By distorting this channeling mechanism, the
subsidized PBGC guaranty allows employers to pursue risky and lowreturn projects. To see how, suppose that, instead of guarantying
pensions, the government agreed to guaranty any commercial debt.
The only qualification is that the borrower must agree to give up any
Ratings?, INSIDER, Oct. 2005, http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/show
article.asp? Art-iclelD=15305.
103
See Zvi Bodie, What the Pension Benefit G~:taranty Corporation Can Learn
from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 10 J. FIN. SERVICES RES.
83 (1996).
104
See id. at 84.
105
See supra note 93.
·~ See Bodie, Asset-Liability Matching, supra note 76, at 324-28.
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tax deduction for the interest expense. The hypothetical guaranty
would be enormously expensive for taxpayers. But, let us ignore
taxpayer expense, as we are with the PBGC guaranty. Is there any
other reason for society to reject the hypothetical loan guaranty? The
answer turns out to be "yes," because the guaranty diverts scarce
capital to wasteful and risky projects.
The proper channeling of capital, without the interference of
federal loan guaranties, can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that
ABC Co. is being formed. Currently, the risk-free rate of interest is
5% and ABC Co. is looking to borrow funds. Fortunately for ABC
Co., lenders are risk neutral in this hypothetical world. Risk
neutrality does not, however, mean that ABC Co. can borrow at 5%.
Instead, it means that lenders must expect a 5% return, after
accounting for the risk of default. After all, corporate shareholders
enjoy limited liability and even risk neutral lenders need more than
107
5% interest to offset the chance that they would not be repaid. So,
before Lend Co. lends $1 million to ABC Co. for one year, Lend Co.
needs to expect a payment of $1,050,000.
Now, suppose that ABC Co. would be capitalized solely with the
loan from Lend Co. ABC Co. is considering a project that requires a
$1 million investment, has a 50% chance of complete loss of the $1
million, and a 50% chance of a return of the $1 million plus an
additional $900,000. The cash flows from the project are as follows:
TABLE II.

Cash Flows from Project

Year 1
Year 2

50% Chance
50% Chance
Expected Value in Year 2

$ (1,000,000)
$
0
$ 1,900,000
$ 950,000

Lend Co. would not lend the money to ABC Co. without the federal
loan guaranty. Even if Lend Co. could reap all of the returns from the
project, it can expect to receive only $950,000. However, Lend Co.
needs an expected payment of $1,050,000 to generate a 5% return.
Lend Co.'s refusal to lend the $1 million is a good thing from the
perspective of society. The project has an expected loss of 5%.
Because the risk-free rate is 5%, there must be other, worthier
projects that produce returns of at least 5%. Society is better off if
Lend Co. finances those projects rather than the one ABC Co. 1s
considering.
107

Even without formal limits on liability, there would still be a risk of default.
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In contrast, suppose the federal government guarantied the debt.
Lend Co. is now perfectly willing to lend the $1 million as it is assured
of repayment. The shareholders of ABC Co. are now on board as
well and stand to make a handsome profit. If the project succeeds,
they will make $850,000 (i.e., the $1,900,000 return minus the
$1,050,000 payment of principal and interest to Lend Co.) If the
project fails, they make or lose nothing and the federal government
pays off Lend Co. Thus, the ABC Co. shareholders have an expected
payment of $425,000 on the project.
TABLE III.

Cash Flows to Shareholders with Federal Guaranty
$
Year 1
0
$
0
Year2
50% Chance
$850,000
50% Chance
Expected Value in Year 2 $425,000

But the federal guaranty has not made the project any better for
society. It is the same loser that it was before. The guaranty has,
108
however, made the project a winner for ABC Co. and Lend Co.
The guaranty burdens society in two ways. First, taxpayers must pay
for the guaranty. In this example, the payment is $1,050,000 if the
project fails. Second, scarce capital is being diverted into a risky and
wasteful project.
Moreover, the diversion benefits only the financially weak firms
that are willing to give up the tax deduction in exchange for the
guaranty. Strong companies with high marginal tax rates and low
costs of borrowing will reject the guaranty. Companies with low
marginal tax rates and high costs of borrowing will accept the
guaranty. Federal loan guaranties allow the weakest companies to
pursue overly risky, perhaps even wasteful, projects. They can be
109
seen as a form of "lemon socialism," subsidizing the least viable
108

This is simply a variation of the well-known incentive that limited liability
equity holders have to shift risk to their creditors. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 50 (1991).
109
Cf. Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance:
From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295,
1338 n.140 (1995) ("If socialism is a system of public ownership of the means of
production, 'lemon socialism' refers to a system of government purchase and/or
subsidy for unproductive or failing sectors of the economy. The government buys a
lemon rather than nationalizing a Cadillac."); George Will, Hot Tubs and Cold
Moralizing, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 2006, at B7 (equating "lemon socialism" with "tax
subsidies for failing businesses that the market says should fail"). The phrase has
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firms in their pursuit of wasteful, risky investments.
Of course, there are differences between a general loan guaranty
and a pension guaranty. Companies cannot raise unlimited funds at
zero transaction costs using their pension plans. The PBGC premiums
have some relationship to risk and partial plan funding is required.
Also, pension plans are subject to notoriously heavy regulation.
Nonetheless, underfunded pension plans allow employers to finance a
portion of their labor costs and less economically viable companies
will underfund to take advantage of the subsidized PBGC guaranty.
Underfunded pensions are government guarantied debt. Thus, the
social cost of the PBGC guaranty is essentially the same as that of the
guarantied commercial loan.
Eliminating this lemon socialism
through full funding is the subject of the next Part.
IV. DESIGNING A FULL FUNDING REGIME
A. Introduction

Congress needs to revisit the pension funding and insurance rules
to satisfy the risk-minimization and employer-internalization goals.
There are three potential ways for ERISA to satisfy these goals: (1)
greatly increasing the priority of the PBGC during employer
bankruptcy or liquidation; (2) directing the PBGC to charge marketbased premiums; and (3) requiring full funding of plans.
Some legal commentators have asserted that first-priority lien in
110
bankruptcy would help solve the funding crisis. Then, so long as the
employer had enough gross assets to satisfy its pension claims, funding
and the PBGC guaranty would be irrelevant (although the PBGC
would retain its role as debt collector). Other voluntary creditors
could protect their interests by demanding that the employer fund its
plan and secure its pension obligations. Such a system would
doubtlessly impose transition costs on existing creditors who would
see their existing priority fall behind the PBGC's. Without transition
rules, the first-priority lien may violate the takings clause of the
111
Constitution and effective transition rules may well be impossible to

been attributed to John Kenneth Galbraith. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi
Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure, 24
TRANSP. L.J. 73, 76 n.8 (1996).
110
See Keating, Moral Hazard, supra note 42, at 100-01; cf. Keating, Ten- Ton
Monster, supra note at 60, passim (describing the low priority that the PBGC claims
receive in bankruptcy).
111
Cf, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29 (1991) ("[L]egislation might
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draft into law.
Another approach would be to allow the PBGC to charge market
premiums for its guaranty. As a federal institution, the PBGC would
face severe difficulties setting market prices for its premiums. The
PBGC would be handicapped in pricing risk, which turns not only on
funding levels but the credit quality of the employer. Even if the
PBGC could price risk, it would need to do so on a case-by-case basis.
The determinations would be made in agency hearings, not
commercial negotiations. Effective funding reform should minimize
the role of the PBGC, not expand it.
112
Requiring private insurance would be problematic as well.
There is no history of private pension insurance in this country and it
is unclear that any insurers would actually supply such a product. Of
course, insurers would be willing to issue annuity contracts that pay
benefits, but such contracts are simply another form of plan funding.
The most difficult problem with private insurance would be
keeping it from lapsing before bankruptcy. Consider, again, our
stylized pension that pays a $1 million lump sum in ten years. It is
currently unfunded, but guarantied by a private insurer under a policy
that lasts for one year. Now, suppose that the employer hits financial
difficulty, making bankruptcy very likely. There is no problem if the
employer goes bankrupt in the next year while covered by the
insurance. But, what if the employer is still distressed, but not yet
bankrupt, after the insurance expires in one year? Since bankruptcy is
very likely, the insurer will probably charge a premium that is almost
the cost of full funding. Rather than paying this high premium, the
employer might simply enter bankruptcy without pension insurance.
Unless there is some mechanism to ensure that private insurance
would be renewed, coverage could routinely lapse and violate the riskminimization goal.
The remaining option is to require full funding and this approach
is feasible. Congress has amended the rules several times, most
recently with PPA 2006, and Congressional staff know how to draft
funding standards and related transition rules. Focusing on the
be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of
parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is
substantially disproportionate to the parties' experience.").
112
Richard Ippolito has proposed a combination of PBGC reform and private
insurance. He would have all plan sponsors belong to a common pool governed by a
board elected by the plans. The board would set rates according to market principles,
but plans could opt out if they buy private insurance. See Ippolito, supra note 29, at
13-15.
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funding standards would also minimize the role of federal regulators,
as there would be no role for funding waivers or determining the
creditworthiness of employers that have fully funded plans.
Employers would, instead, rely on the existing actuarial profession to
satisfy their obligations. Since plan funds are held in trust, past
funding does not need to be renewed, as private insurance would.
The remainder of this Part sketches a practicable system that would
minimize funding shortfalls while respecting employer freedom. 113
B. Measurement of Pension Assets and Liabilities
The key to outlawing plan-funding shortfalls is an accurate,
periodic measure of assets and liabilities at fair market value. The
difference between asset and liability values represents the exposure
that retirees and the PBGC have to employer default. Eliminating
this exposure should be the goal of the funding rules.
Valuing assets should be straightforward but has been obscured
by the current funding rules. Subpart III.C.3 described the practice of
smoothing. Rather than requiring current, fair market value for
assets, the funding rules allow the use of historical averages calculated
over the prior two to five years. But only current value describes the
amount of assets available to satisfy claims. Historical prices are
irrelevant to current values and to future returns. In other words, the
114
market has no memory.
The funding rules should forget historical
prices as well.
For similar reasons, the funding rules should forget past liabilities
and interest rates. Current law allows employers to value liabilities
using a historical average of interest rates. Historical prices tell us
nothing about the current cost of funding or even the future of
interest rate movements. Debt markets forget about historical
interest rates and the funding rules should as well.
Smoothing of assets and liabilities allows employers to avoid
making contributions in response to volatility. But, such volatility has
costs, which the employer-internalization goal places upon the
115
employer.
An abrupt fall in assets and rise in liabilities creates a
real funding shortfall that needs to be remedied. The funding rules
treat such shortfalls as aberrations that will pass, rather than breaches
113

See Jeremy Gold, Never Again: A Transition to a Secure Private Pension
System, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Fall2005, at 92.
114
See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 34950 (8th ed. 2006).
115
See Bader & Gold, supra note 5, at 9.
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that may widen. Indeed, financial volatility is what moved the PBGC
116
from surplus to deficit status at the beginning of this new century.
Thus, assets should be measured at current, fair market value and
liabilities should be valued at an appropriate, current rate of interest.
Part II.C discussed the idea of a "settlement rate," which is the
discount rate that would be used if the employer tried to discharge its
pension obligations. The correct settlement rate is subject to debate.
If the risk-minimization goal is to be fully implemented, then
employee pensions must be risk free. And, risk-free pensions must be
valued according to the risk-free rate of return on Treasury bonds.
However, current law does not make pensions completely risk
free. Employees suffer default risk on benefits above the PBGC cap
and the PBGC is not even backed by the federal government.
Employers can also terminate plans by buying annuity contracts,
which have some default risk. A new funding regime could possibly
divide plan liabilities. Liabilities that are insured by the PBGC would
be valued at the risk-free rate. Other liabilities would be valued at
some higher but still conservative rate of interest. The yield on high. grade corporate bonds may be appropriate for this purpose.
In summary, the funding rules should value assets and liabilities at
current values rather than historical averages. This approach would
identify shortfalls caused by volatility rather than allowing employers
117
to hide them with smoothing rules. The details of valuing liabilities
may require more study, but this Article suggests a bifurcation
approach. All benefits guarantied by the PBGC would be discounted
to present value using the risk-free rate on Treasury bonds. All other
benefits would be discounted to present value using a conservative
rate based on corporate bonds.
C. Plan Funding and Investing
The valuation described in the prior Part would occur annually
and would expose any shortfalls in plan funding. Funding shortfalls
may exist for several reasons: because the plan was never well funded
in the first place; because of volatility of assets and liabilities; or
because the employer amended the plan to grant new benefits. Under
the proposal of this Article, the employer would be liable to fund the
shortfalls immediately, regardless of their cause. The proposal would
prohibit the amortization or waiver of funding shortfalls.

116
117

See Bodie, supra note 76, at 325-26.
See Bader & Gold, supra note 5.
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Plan liabilities would also grow each year as covered employees
perform more service and earn more compensation. The employer
would need to forecast the present value of additional benefits that
will accrue under the plan for the current year. Unless the plan was
sufficiently overfunded, the employer would need to contribute an
118
amount to pay for these additional accruals.
As the proposal
ensures that plans are fully funded on a current basis, past
contributions over the minimum (i.e., credit balances) have no place
in calculating actual contributions.
The proposal of this Part allows employers and plan fiduciaries to
retain their freedom over plan investments. Plan fiduciaries could
continue to invest in equities, even though equity investments create a
large mismatch between assets and liabilities. The only limit would be
119
the existing rules on fiduciary investing from ERISA.
Equity investing by plans runs counter to financial theory, which
suggests that employers should invest pension assets in a fixed-income
120
portfolio rather than in equities. Plan investments in equities create
financial volatility that exposes employees and the PBGC to risk of
loss. Theoretically, equities do not create value for shareholders,
because shareholders can buy their own equities on the market.
It is tempting to require plans to comply with this theory. For
better or for worse, however, the notion that equities are a suitable
plan investment is firmly fixed in the world of pensions. Moreover,
requiring investment in fixed-income securities could disrupt capital
markets, causing a disruption in the investment strategies already
mapped out for billions of dollars of assets.
The proposal allows plans to cling to equity investments, but
makes employers responsible for any resulting shortfall. Employers
can continue to play the stock market, but would need to face margin
calls for the full shortfall. Equity investing in particular can cause a
mismatch between assets and liabilities. If the mismatch produces
losses, the employer would need to make them up on an annual basis.
If the mismatch produces gains, the gains would offset the need to
make future contributions. The margin call, not regulation, protects
against mismatches between assets and liabilities. If, however, the
plan fails before it can make a margin call, the PBGC would still need
to insure benefits, as discussed in the next Part.

8
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/d. at 9-10.
For an overview, see LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 6, at 802-52.
See SCHOLES ET AL. , supra note 51, at 264--67.
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D. Insurance for Actuarial Mistakes and Short-Term Volatility
Any reform requiring full funding would, as a practical matter,
require a lengthy transition period (perhaps five or even ten years).
After some point in the future, however, employers would need to
have fully funded plans. The role of the PBGC as guarantor should
diminish over the course of the transition but would not completely
end.
After the transition, the proposal of this Part leaves the PBGC
121
with a reduced but continued role.
Employees would still face
default risk from short-term fluctuations in assets and liabilities, from
valuations of liabilities that fall short of actual experience, and from
fraudulent behavior. Because the proposal strives to eliminate
underfunding, claims against the PBGC would become extraordinary.
There are even good reasons for the PBGC to become wholly
supported by taxpayers under the proposal. Without systematic
underfunding, the lemon socialism of the current PBGC guaranty
disappears. Thus, the guaranty would have little or no impact on
economic efficiency. If premiums were charged, they would almost
certainly be flat-rate premiums. Such premiums do not reflect risk
and do not further the employer-internalization goal.
Public funding would also force Congress and the PBGC to
become more vigilant watchdogs of pension funding. It is all too easy
under the current arrangement for Congress to cut special deals for
the worst risks with special funding rules and the like. The effects of
those deals are pushed into the future and wished away by interposing
the PBGC. Wishful thinking would be far harder if Congress needed
to fund it with appropriations.
V. CONCLUSION

Low-risk pensions minimize the default risks faced by employees.
They do not bear any costs associated with default. Congress failed to
assign these costs in a coherent manner under current law and PPA
2006. Rather than assigning the appropriate cost to each employer,
Congress has allowed it to rest, collectively, on financially strong
employers. If the PBGC fails, the costs may end up resting on
taxpayers in the future. The cure is a system of full funding, which
would make each employer responsible for the costs of delivering lowrisk pensions to its own employees.
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See Bader, Unnecessary Evil, supra note 40, at 18.

